Allen Weiner, senior lecturer in law, discusses the war in Ukraine, law governing the use of force, the limitations of the UN to rein in member nations, NATO support for Ukraine, the prospects of war crimes prosecutions, how this historic conflict might end, and more.
Stanford Law and Cyber Policy faculty members including Professor Nate Persily, Daphne Keller, and Evelyn Douek weigh in on this week's SCOTUS oral arguments on major cases involving Internet platform regulation.
George Brown, executive director of the Stanford Center for Racial Justice, discusses the recently released NALP Report on Diversity in U.S. Law Firms, which raises several important issues regarding diversity in the legal profession.
After 14 years as the executive director of the John and Terry Levin Center for Public Service and Public Interest Law, Anna Wang will assume the role of Associate Dean for Public Service and Public Interest Law.
The understanding of the individuals who voted to make the Constitution the governing document of the nation and supreme law over consenting States provides rich context for evaluating the original public meaning of the constitutional text as well as accountability constraints applicable to contemporary federal officials. In addition to the accountability mechanisms most commonly arising in modern public discourse such as impeachment and removal of federal officials, the ratifiers of the original 1788 U.S. constitution and 18th-century officials believed that federal authority would be restrained by a collective suite of new constitutional, statutory, and preexisting common-law mechanisms. Those mechanisms included the constitutional oaths clauses, the availability of preexisting common-law causes of action against federal officials, the posting of bond by executive officials involved in handling federal funds, statutory conflict-of-interest prohibitions, and transparency requirements imposed on Congress but not the executive branch.
Jennifer Mascott is an Assistant Professor of Law and Co-Executive Director of The C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State at the Antonin Scalia Law School. Professor Mascott writes in the areas of administrative and constitutional law and the separation of powers.
February 27, 2023
4:45 pm – 5:00 pm | Dinner served
5:00 pm – 6:00 pm | Lecture
The understanding of the individuals who voted to make the Constitution the governing document of the nation and supreme law over consenting States provides rich context for evaluating the original public meaning of the constitutional text as well as accountability constraints applicable to contemporary federal officials. In addition to the accountability mechanisms most commonly arising in modern public discourse such as impeachment and removal of federal officials, the ratifiers of the original 1788 U.S. constitution and 18th-century officials believed that federal authority would be restrained by a collective suite of new constitutional, statutory, and preexisting common-law mechanisms. Those mechanisms included the constitutional oaths clauses, the availability of preexisting common-law causes of action against federal officials, the posting of bond by executive officials involved in handling federal funds, statutory conflict-of-interest prohibitions, and transparency requirements imposed on Congress but not the executive branch.
